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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-2051
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DAVID DIAZ,
                                      Appellant
                          
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 06-cr-00202-1)
District Judge:  The Honorable Anita B. Brody
                           
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 2, 2009
                           
Before: BARRY, WEIS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:  March 26, 2009)
                           
OPINION
                           
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant David Diaz was indicted on three counts: one for illegal reentry after
      More specifically, Diaz was charged with illegal reentry after deportation, in1
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 100
kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and aiding and abetting
possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
-2-
deportation, and two for violations of the drug laws.   After pleading guilty to the illegal1
reentry count, a jury convicted Diaz on the drug counts.  On appeal, Diaz challenges his
sentence of 121 months imprisonment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
judgment of sentence.
I.
This case arises out of a drug interdiction that occurred at the Mexican border in
2005.  After stopping a tractor-trailer truck and detecting something suspicious, border
patrol agents discovered over 1,000 pounds of marijuana hidden in adobe-style plaster
products.  Hoping to ensnare the drug purchasers in a sting operation, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents then arranged for the truck to be transported from
Texas to Pennsylvania.  The sting was successful: a variety of persons, including Diaz,
were eventually arrested and indicted in connection with the drug bust.
Diaz pled guilty to the illegal reentry count, and was convicted on the two drug
counts.  At sentencing, the District Court imposed a two-level enhancement after finding
that Diaz acted in a supervisory role pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  Taking this
enhancement into account, Diaz had a base offense level of 31; with a criminal history
category of II, he faced a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months.  The District Court
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ultimately sentenced Diaz to the low end of the range, 121 months.
Diaz alleges error in two respects: first, he asserts that his sentence violates United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and its progeny because the sentencing
enhancement and facts undergirding that enhancement were not proven to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt; second, he asserts that the District Court committed clear error when
it found that Diaz acted in a supervisory role.
II.
The government did not have to prove the sentencing enhancement to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The now-familiar remedial holding of Booker dictates that
because the Guidelines are advisory, facts upon which sentencing enhancements are
based need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Booker, 543
U.S. at 244-68; United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565-66 (3d Cir. 2007).  Indeed, Diaz
acknowledges that this issue is raised for “the purpose of preserving [it] for possible
review by the United States Supreme Court.”  (Appellant’s Br. 10.)  There was no error.
III.  
Diaz next challenges whether the evidence supports the District Court’s finding
that he played a supervisory role.  The relevant Guidelines provision provides for a two-
level enhancement if a defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in
the criminal activity in question.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  We will reverse the District
Court’s factual determination here “only if its conclusion was clearly erroneous.”  United
      Diaz’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence is unavailing.  While it is true2
that his co-conspirators were cooperating with the government and hoping for leniency
and that they had used drugs in the past, such motivations and circumstances are
commonplace and do not preclude the Court from relying on that evidence.  Additionally,
hearsay evidence is generally admissible at sentencing.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
1101(d)(3) (noting that Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable in sentencing
proceedings); United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting
contention that the Sixth Amendment precludes admission of hearsay evidence at
sentencing, calling “[t]he law on this issue . . . well settled”).  
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States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement
even though the record on the issue was “not extensive”).  An enhancement under §
3B1.1(c)  need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  See supra (discussing
and rejecting Diaz’s Booker challenge).
The District Court did not err in granting the supervisory role enhancement.  In
making its determination, the Court considered the trial and grand jury testimony of
Diaz’s co-conspirators, the statements of his co-conspirators as recounted by an ICE
agent, and a videotape showing Diaz at the scene while other persons unloaded the
drugs.   (See App. 417-18.)  This evidence supports the finding that Diaz played a2
supervisory role.  (See, e.g., id. at 233-50 (co-conspirator trial testimony); id. at 408-09
(ICE agent testimony recounting statements of co-conspirators that indicate Diaz directed
them); see also Supplemental App. 7-8, 14 (co-conspirator grand jury testimony
indicating Diaz hired co-conspirator to drive him).)  
Diaz correctly notes that § 3B1.1(c) cannot apply if all the participants to a crime
share equal responsibility.  See, e.g., United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir.
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1992) (finding that supervisory role enhancement cannot apply unless defendant had
control over at least one person).  However, the District Court concluded that the
participants in this crime did not share equal responsibility, and that Diaz had a
supervisory role.  The supervisory role enhancement can apply to a number of persons
within the ambit of the same conspiracy, and the District Court did not err in concluding
that Diaz was a supervisor within the conspiracy and deserving of the enhancement.  
IV.
We will affirm the judgment of sentence.
